Do you feel lucky punk? - Prosecuting Consequences (by David G. Chow)

"I know what you're thinking. "Did he fire six shots or only five?" Well, to tell you the truth, in all this excitement I kind of lost track myself. But being as this is a .44 Magnum, the most powerful handgun in the world, and would blow your head clean off, you've got to ask yourself a question: Do I feel lucky?....Well, do ya punk?"

Dirty Harry[1]

Getting behind the wheel of a car is like playing Russian-Roulette – engage the transmission, step on the gas and take your chances. The urban landscape is crawling with armored vehicles, operated at high speeds by human beings subject to the frailties of the human condition. A momentary lapse of attention, an unexpected event or something as simple as minor negligence can result in dire consequences. Notwithstanding the highly publicized carnage on Canada’s highways, citizens happily enter motor carriages without a second thought as to their likelihood of surviving the commute. With so many people sharing limited space, accidents happen. Sometimes accidents are avoidable and sometimes they are not. Accidents can happen to the best of us.

Criminal culpability in Canada is premised upon the notion that people are the intentional authors of their own actions. From a criminal justice perspective, a person cannot be sanctioned for something he or she did not do. The actus reus of an offence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. By the same token, a person cannot be punished for something he or she did not intend to do. In many cases the actus reus of the offence is clear, but the mens rea of the crime involves much deeper considerations. This is especially so for allegations of criminal driving. Generally speaking, intentionality involves an assessment of what was transpiring in the actor’s mind at the time of the impugned conduct. Assessing the inner workings of the mind, however, involves deeper, more complex considerations than merely observing or supplying evidence of the act itself. Since motorists seldom intend to injure or kill their fellow citizens, the mens rea of driving offences is often difficult to assess.

From a morality perspective, a person cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault or for occurrences beyond their control; yet people are regularly prosecuted for crimes of result, rather than crimes of intent. In a civilization where morality is legislated through various laws designed to control human behavior, there are serious questions as to whether prosecutions arising from some allegations of impugned conduct – such as problematic driving – are more logically connected to the result rather than the conduct itself? This paper focuses upon the question: if the underlying conduct would not be criminalized but for an intervening tragic event, should the accused be convicted or even prosecuted at all? This paper suggests that in some cases people are prosecuted and even convicted for behavior in which moral accountability is the same regardless of the consequences.

On August 18th, 2008, Angela Ta was found not guilty of careless driving and other Traffic Safety Act offences in a collision that killed six-year old Jenna Chang. In a carefully worded written decision, Judge Catherine Skene said: “Based on the evidence and testimony that I did have before me, there is evidence to suggest that the two pedestrians stepped off the sidewalk and/or curb, on to the roadway…into the path of Ta’s vehicle when Ta’s vehicle was so close that it was impracticable for the driver to yield the right of way”. As reported by the Calgary Herald, an understandably emotional Wei Chang, the girl’s father said “[i]t’s just very sad…very tough,…[t]his case, justice is not served…”[2]. The Crown obviously agreed, for they appealed the learned trial judge’s decision[3].

R. v. Bjerknes and Conroy began as a prosecution for criminal negligence causing death. Ultimately, both accused were acquitted of criminal negligence and the lesser included offences of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm in relation to a collision involving a pedestrian who stepped suddenly and without prior warning into the path of an oncoming motorcycle travelling approximating 70 km/hour in a 50 km zone. In acquitting the accused of causing death and bodily injury, Mr. Justice Peter McIntyre aptly stated: “In my view, the legal cause of…death was his jaywalking. I doubt the result would have been any different had the accused not been speeding”[4].

The cases of Bjerknes and Ta beg the question: would there have been a prosecution had there not been an intervening tragic event? More precisely, had the pedestrian not stepped in front of Ms. Ta’s vehicle, would she have been prosecuted for careless driving and other Traffic Safety Act offences? Had the pedestrian not impeded the progress of Mr. Bjerknes, would he have been charged with criminal negligence causing death? Arguably the answer is no.

In R. v. J.B., [2003] A.J. No. 508 (Alta. P.C.) the accused was prosecuted for dangerous driving causing death when he lost control of his motorcycle while travelling at speeds up to 84 km/hour in a 50 km zone. In acquitting the accused, Judge Sandra Hamilton astutely commented: "Speed is often a factor in motor vehicle accidents. However, speed is clearly frequently engaged in without any resultant accident. Tragically, as a result of J.B.'s speeding, a family has lost a beloved son and J.B. has lost his best friend. That terrible consequence, however, does not of itself elevate the unlawful behavior of speeding to the crime of dangerous driving. It is not the case that the thousands of people in this country who hurtle down the roads at excessive speeds daily are a mere consequence away from criminality[5]".

Though Judge Hamilton was ideally correct, the reality is, in some cases people are a mere consequence away from criminality. Mr. Bjerknes, for example, was convicted of dangerous driving, even though it is arguably unlikely that he would have been prosecuted for criminal negligence or dangerous driving had the accident not occurred. It is beside the point that he may have been liable for speeding, or stunting or some other traffic violation; for there is a distinction between actual criminal behavior and violating one of any number of a seemingly innumerable array of traffic safety laws. To prove the point, the reader need only draw upon personal experience. Simply reflect upon your travels during the morning commute to the office. One would be hard pressed to seriously dispute the fact that at any given moment a veritable gaggle of motorists are hurtling down the street at speeds exceeding the posted limit. Some are even talking on cellular telephones, fiddling with the radio, conducting multiple lane changes while doing a myriad of other things other than keeping their hands at the ten-and-two position and their eyes firmly fixed on the road. Unless the driving is outrageous, most ordinary citizens simply accept minor rule breaking and may even become upset and scold authorities when they enforce a perceived trivial law. Watch the road long enough and you might even see a member of the local constabulary breaking the rules too.

Certainly traffic tickets are issued for minor infractions, such as speeding, but the State is not actively corralling trivial rule breakers and charging them with criminal driving offences. I am sure most people, including lawyers, police, prosecutors, judges, politicians – including our outspoken Minister of Justice – have broken the rules of the road on occasion and perhaps even got a little lucky along the way. Putting it mildly, to say otherwise would be just a little hypocritical. But what if a motorist wasn’t so lucky? What if during the hurried morning commute, the motorist, while sipping his or her coffee and travelling 20 km/hour over the posted speed limit collides with a child that appeared instantaneously from in between a pair of parked cars? Assume for the moment the collision was unavoidable. Should the unlucky motorist be prosecuted for careless driving, dangerous driving or criminal negligence? Other than the collision, what is it about the driving pattern that elevates the responsibility owed by the driver in these circumstances? Obviously there was no actual intent to collide with the child. That the driver was speeding and sipping coffee does not necessarily make the driving dangerous or even careless. Accident or no accident, it seems our lead footed example is only guilty of breaking a relatively trivial Traffic Safety Act law. Yet on occasion, people in similar circumstances, such as J.B., are charged and prosecuted for more serious crimes than they deserve.

Even if many accused are relieved of criminal responsibility after trial, cases such as Bjerknes, Ta and J.B. illustrate that citizens are indeed a mere consequence away from being hauled before the criminal justice system on the basis of an event rather than the underlying conduct. If the accused would not have been charged with the criminal driving offence but for the accident, there are serious concerns as to the real basis for the prosecution.

Anytime an accused is brought before the criminal justice system, there is a chance of conviction. A truly honest lawyer will tell his or her client, “you roll the dice each and every time you go to trial, there are no guarantees”. A fundamental protection for all citizens against the possibility of wrongful conviction is vested both in the Crown’s discretion not to prosecute as well as their discretion to direct the nature of the prosecution. To be fair, in R. v. Ta the Crown very properly exercised her discretion not to prosecute criminally, choosing rather to pursue charges under to the Traffic Safety Act. Regrettably, the same cannot be said in all cases. J.B. was prosecuted for dangerous driving causing death. Astonishingly, Bjerknes and Conroy were prosecuted for criminal negligence causing death. Given the varying degrees of discretion exercised by individuals conducting business in the criminal justice system, J.B., Bjerknes and Conroy were arguably unlucky that the exercise of discretion was not in their favor.

Luck plays an important role in human interactions. Surprisingly, good and bad luck is critical to a comprehensive analysis of moral responsibility. The concept of moral luck presupposes that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault or for occurrences beyond their control. In the words of philosopher Thomas Nagel, “[w]here a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck. Such luck can be good or bad”[6]. To illustrate, Nagel imagines a motorist who after failing to have his brakes checked, accidentally runs over a child who unexpectantly enters the path of his vehicle. With this in mind, he says:

"…if the driver was guilty of even a minor degree of negligence – failing to have his brakes checked recently, for example – then if that negligence contributes to the death of the child, he will not merely feel terrible. He will blame himself for the death. And what makes this an example of moral luck is that he would have to blame himself only slightly for the negligence itself if no situation arose which required him to brake suddenly and violently to avoid hitting a child. Yet the negligence is the same in both cases, and the driver has no control over whether a child will run into his path[7]".

Nagel argues there are four ways in which natural objects of moral assessment are subject to luck. Constitutive luck concerns the kind of person you are. Human beings, for example, are constructed from a genetic code transmitted from their parents. In addition to being biological creatures, people are constructed from environment and upbringing. A second kind of luck concerns circumstances. What kind of problems and situations is the moral agent confronted with? As Nagel says, “[t]he things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we face, are importantly determined by factors beyond our control. It may be true of someone that in a dangerous situation he would behave cowardly or heroic fashion, but if the situation never arises, he will never have the chance to distinguish or disgrace himself in this way, and his moral record will be different”[8]. The other two kinds of luck have to do with causes and effects of action. How are situations determined as a result of antecedent circumstances? What are the consequences of actions performed? It is the latter kinds of luck – causes and effects – that are pertinent to this discussion.

In all the circumstances, it was unlucky that the pedestrian unexpectantly obstructed the path of Mr. Bjerknes as he was driving down a busy street. But for this unfortunate, intervening event, Bjerknes and Conroy would very likely have proceeded to their intended destination without incident. Certainly both individuals were guilty of problematic driving. Like thousands of motorists propelling themselves on highways across Canada, they exceeded the posted limit by approximately 20 km/hour. Both motorcyclists revved their engines loudly and accelerated quickly for upwards of five intersections. At each intersection they properly and lawfully brought their vehicles to a halt. Arguably, they raced each other as they accelerated quickly from intersection to intersection. Though both motorcyclists occasionally weaved from lane to lane, they never impeded other users of the roadway. The collision occurred when the pedestrian stepped-out unexpectantly from in between two parked cars. All witnesses unanimously agreed that the collision was instantaneous. Doubtless, Bjerknes did not intend to collide with the pedestrian, in fact, he attempted to avoid the collision. For his efforts, Bjerknes was thrown from his motorcycle. Whether the collision occurred or not, the negligence is the same and Bjerknes had no control over the pedestrian stepping into his path.

What makes this an instance of institutional bad luck is that the accused was prosecuted for criminal negligence causing death for behavior, that but for the collision, would not likely have resulted in any criminal prosecution whatsoever. In fact, it is doubtful that a peace officer would have charged the Bjerknes and Conroy criminally had the extent of the case been an observed driving pattern without the collision. By the same token, what makes this an instance of institutional good luck was that the case was heard by a wise member of the judiciary, capable of fully comprehending the law and making tough decisions. What makes this a case of moral bad luck is that Bjerknes and Conroy sustained increased moral accountability for an instance of fate rather than intentional conduct. Simply stated, they had no control over the pedestrian stepping into Bjerknes’ path.

As Nagel commented “…it is not enough to say merely that our basic moral attitudes towards ourselves and others are determined by what is actual; for they are also threatened by the sources of that actuality, and by the external view of action which forces itself on us when we see how everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created”[9]. Is there really any difference in the world of criminal responsibility? If a moral agent is threatened by sources of actuality outside of his or her control, surely it is not inconceivable that the target of a criminal prosecution may be subject to similar instances arising from participation in a world that he or she did not create.

Though this discussion may seem like some kind of philosophical black magic importing pedantic views into a pragmatic criminal justice system, in this writer’s view, it is precisely the opposite. To be truly pragmatic, participants in the criminal justice system ought to be encouraged to be internally sincere and not to attach criminal culpability for conduct engaged by a multitude of others, including themselves. Unfortunately, not every decision in criminal justice is as honest, erudite and practical as that of Judge Hamilton in R. v. J.B. Make no mistake, sometimes decisions go the other way. In such cases, one is left to wonder whether justice has truly been served.

Get behind the wheel of your car, engage the transmission, step on the gas and take your chances. Do you feel lucky punk?

Submitted by:

David G. Chow

Barrister

Fagan & Chow

www.faganandchow.com

________________________________________________________________

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_Harry
[2] http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=a523a353-e261-4ad8-aa1f-ac1bcd840315
[3] http://edmontonsun.com/News/Alberta/2008/09/18/6800796-sun.html
[4] http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/city/story.html?id=1fd2741a-8cab-4b00-b1f8-b866040c4b33
[5] Para. 8.
[6] Thomas Nagel, “Moral Luck”, Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, 1979: pg. 26.
[7] Ibid., 29.
[8] Ibid., 34.
[9] Ibid., 38.

Who is George J. Gaschler, Q.C.? - The Judicial Appointment Process (by David G. Chow)

Who is George J. Gaschler, Q.C.?

According to the Alberta Government website Mr. Gaschler, Q.C. is Calgary’s newly minted Provincial Court, Criminal Division gavel slinger, who will, after a brief stint of shadowing Judges, such as prolific jurist Judge Allan Fradsham, will be delivering his brand of justice to those responsible for the much publicized plague of crime on Calgary’s City streets. At the outset, let me be clear, this article is not saying that Mr. Gaschler, Q.C. will not be, as Justice Minister Alison Redford stated in her July 30th, 2008 news release, an “outstanding individual”[1], nor am I claiming that he will not be a fair minded, legally oriented judge, interested in ensuring that real justice is done on a quotidian basis. Rather, my difficulty is that aside from the rather brief resume highlighted on the Alberta Government’s Website, I know absolutely nothing about George J. Gaschler, Q.C.. More importantly, as a citizen interested in being informed on issues in criminal justice, I was never apprised that Mr. Gaschler, Q.C. was even on a short list of potential candidates. Not surprisingly, as a citizen, I was never given an opportunity to be educated on such important decisions by our Alberta Government, nor was I ever offered an opportunity to contribute to dialogue on important issues such as who will sit in judgment of citizens of this Province.

Now, perhaps some readers will think, “pray-tell, why does a virtual nobody such as David Chow need to know”? Well, it seems to me that in a so-called democracy the views of the citizenry are important; and in my view, springing important appointments, such as who will be a judge, on an unsuspecting populace is far from a democratic, fair or right minded process. So back to my original question: who is George J. Gaschler, Q.C.?

I decided to do a little research.

The Alberta Government Website advises that Mr. Gaschler, Q.C. spent much of his career practicing law in Fort Macleod, Alberta in the area of land expropriation, irrigation and civil litigation. He was also counsel for the Lethbridge Police Association, was an ad hoc prosecutor in Lethbridge and spent three years prosecuting by-law infractions for the City of Calgary. Interestingly, this is just about the only information available on Calgary’s newest judicial appointment. The same information is essentially posted on the City of Calgary Website[2], and is again plagiarized on a website titled “nationtalk.ca”[3]. Now, don’t let the title of the website fool you, for there was no talk about the judicial appointment on “Nationtalk”. In fact, the post on Nationtalk happened after the appointment already occurred. No debate. No discussion. No dialogue.

Despite the resume, a question remains: why George J. Gaschler, Q.C. as Provincial Court Judge?

In my view the answer is not really gleaned by merely reviewing Mr. Gaschler Q.C.’s resume. That he has many long of years of service, or that he is Queen’s Counsel or that he toiled as Appellate Counsel in the early to mid-1980’s in cases such as R. v. Hruby, [1980] A.J. No. 574 (Alta. C.A.) and R. v. Vermeer, [1985] A.J. No. 429 (Alta. C.A.) is of little assistance. . Like many possible candidates, there is little question that his long years of dedication to the Alberta Bar make him a solid candidate. In my mind, the genuine answer to the question, why George Gaschler, Q.C. for Provincial Court Judge comes not so much from his resume, but from his views and insight into issues of Constitutional law and criminal justice. For example, what is his view on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? What does Mr. Gaschler, Q.C. think of the seemingly never-ending proliferation of media reports telling the citizenry that Alberta’s principled, hard working judges are gutless purveyors of a catch-and-release system of justice? Does newly minted Judge Gaschler, Q.C. understand the principles of bail? Does he appreciate the presumption of innocence? How would Mr. Gaschler, Q.C. handle everyday dilemmas in criminal justice, such as excluding evidence that will ultimately lead to the exoneration of the accused knowing full well that the individual is probably guilty? Unfortunately, no such information is readily forthcoming.

Though answers to such questions may appear patently obvious to those with an acute understanding of the criminal law, they are far from so. Indeed, it is not uncommon for participants in the criminal justice system to arrive at vastly different conclusions as to how to deal with similar issues in similar circumstances. Differences in opinion do not merely exist between Crown and Defence, but exist between individual members of the judiciary.

Doubtless, Judge’s are expected to uphold the law and the Constitution. They are expected to understand the rights of all citizens – and surely must appreciate the irony that the rights of all free citizens in Canada are protected through the prosecution of the ignoble deviant. Judges must be courageous – individuals with a high moral compass capable of astutely understanding and applying the principles underlying our criminal justice system. Ideally, judges ought not to be political – for in today’s social climate, politics and lobbying by special interests groups – which includes organizations such as the police, Crown, Government or even the newly formed CDLA – are pervasive. Therefore, the judicial appointment must not be political; rather, it ought to be a strictly merit based appointment, based upon a history of principled service, erudite practice and free of political patronage.

Back to the question, who is George J. Gaschler, Q.C.?

It strikes me that perhaps this isn’t even the right question? Perhaps I am advocating a judicial selection model too closely synonymous with the American system – a paradigm where members of the judiciary are elected rather than appointed. A rather astute lawyer reminded me that such a process may itself be dangerous, for if a judge is too closely tied to a particular political platform, then he or she may be incapable of deviating from that platform as circumstances arise on a case by case basis, thus politicizing the decision making process. Fair enough. So perhaps the better question is who appointed George J. Gaschler Q.C. and why?

Judicial independence is to be assiduously protected. However, according to the Alberta Government Website, judicial appointments are made by the Lieutenant Governor in Council with recommendation of the Provincial Court Nominating Committee. The 11 member Provincial Court Nominating Committee reviews candidates supplied by the Alberta Judicial Council and provides a list of appointees to the Minister of Justice. The Provincial Court Nominating Committee is comprised of two members from the Court of Queen’s Bench, two members specifically appointed by the Minister of Justice and a mixture of representatives from the Alberta Provincial Court, Law Society of Alberta, the Canadian Bar Association along with other undisclosed members of the legal profession and public.

Again, I decided to do a little research.

The Alberta Government Website tells me that the Provincial Court Nominating Committee “provides recommendations to the Minister of Justice on the appointment of individuals to the Provincial Court of Alberta. The committee members are appointed by the Minister of Justice”[4]?

Wait a minute, committee members are appointed by the Minister of Justice”?

The Minister of Justice – in this case, Ms. Alison Redford – is a politically appointed government official. According to the Alberta Justice Website, the provincial Minister of Justice is the senior law officer of the Crown”[5]. So, as I understand, the Minister of Justice selects members to sit on the Provincial Court of Alberta nominating committee. The Provincial Court Nominating Committee then returns a list of potential candidates to the Minister of Justice, who ultimately makes the judicial appointment? In layman’s terms, Alberta’s Minister of Justice reviews a list of candidates that he or she supplied to a committee that he or she selected and then makes a judicial appointment from that list. Forgive me for thinking the process is just a little incestuous.
So who are the members of the Provincial Court Nominating Committee? What relationship do they have with the Minister of Justice or other government officials? What relationship do they have with the batch of candidates returned for consideration to the Minister of Justice? What relationship do candidates have with the Minister of Justice or to the political party itself? What political contributions have been made by prospective candidates or committee members?
Though I am quite certain this information exists, somewhere, it is certainly not readily and easily accessible to members of the public. Various Alberta Government Websites essentially supply boiler plate information with little or no substance. I get the feeling that democracy exists in an informational vacuum, where citizens looking for easy answers to important questions such as why George J. Gaschler, Q.C. for Provincial Court Judge or who sits on the Provincial Court Nominating Committee will be met by a barricade of substance-less boiler plate designed to deflect answers to simple questions.

Perhaps the easiest way to assess a judicial appointment in this Province is to take a hard look at our Minister of Justice; in this case, Ms. Alison Redford? After all, the Minister of Justice appoints the nominating committee, who is responsible for recommending candidates to the Minister of Justice who is responsible for the judicial appointment.
Ms. Redford was recently highlighted in Rick Bell’s journalistic abomination, “No Hugs for Thugs”[6]. In the spirit of today’s news media, Mr. Bell – with the assistance of Ms. Redford – thoroughly lambasted criminal justice in Calgary, even going so far to say “[w]ho except out-of-touch judges, doesn’t know that catch and release only works for fish[7]”. A convenient comment considering that the “catch and release” metaphor was coined by Premier Ed Stelmach, who appointed Alison Redford as Minister of Justice on March 13th, 2008. In his book, Necessary Illusions, Noam Chomsky argued that “…the media serve the interests of the State and corporate power, which are closely interlinked, framing their reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege and limiting debate and discussion accordingly”[8]. This comment aptly applies to Mr. Bell’s article, as well as just about every other press release on justice in recent months. Calgary’s news media has been responsible for reporting a seemingly endless tirade of complaints on justice, including a series of one-sided dialogues by Calgary’s Chief of Police and his various minions. Perhaps not surprisingly, there has been almost a total absence of counter-dialogue from the other side of the debate. No comment from the defence bar, Alberta Civil Liberties Association, Association of the Wrongfully Convicted or anybody else who might conceivably balance perspective.

“No hugs for thugs” is essentially a full page love in with Justice Minister Alison Redford. Like so many Rick Bell articles, it is little more than a propaganda story designed to inspire irrational emotions from unsuspecting members of the public. Sadly, Justice Minister Alison Redford appeared more than ecstatic to participate in the propogandization of important issues.

What exactly did she say?

With a rather dismissive tone she said: “It’s fine to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, but a bail hearing is not like a trial and the reason we have bail is to ensure those people who are not likely to reoffend and will show up for their court date can, in some cases, continue to work”. Considering Ms. Redford’s purported civil rights background[9], it is just a little startling that she comes across as so dismissive of the presumption of innocence. “It’s fine to be presumed innocence until proven guilty…”? Adjectives like “fine” arguably communicate something closer to general annoyance than staunch support for a fundamental precept of Canada’s justice system. “[T]he reason we have bail is ensure those people who are not likely to reoffend and will show up for their court date can, in some cases, continue to work”? Odd, for I was not aware that contributing to Alberta’s economy was a necessary precondition for obtaining judicial interim release”?

Perhaps most frightening are Ms. Redford’s remarks on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. “[W]e need to write vigorous legislation”, she says. “If people don’t like it they can challenge it. The fear of a Charter challenge should not stop us from passing legislation that makes sense”.

Aside from the fact that Parliament obviously should not be writing unconstitutional legislation, this remark ironically brings us full circle back to the initial question: Who is George J. Gaschler, Q.C.?

Judges are responsible for deciding Constitutional issues, and as such, are responsible for determining whether a particular piece of government legislation violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The question is: if Judges have been nominated by an appointment process on the basis of a recommendation from a stacked judicial selection committee and ultimately appointed by government officials such as Alison Redford, what confidence can our civilization have that the judicial appointment will assiduously work to uphold important things such as Constitutional rights? Put another way, if a judicial appointment is a political henchmen (and I am not saying Mr. Gaschler Q.C. is in fact this person), arguably the government can write any number of unconstitutional laws with relative confidence that such laws will be upheld by its appointed representatives on the bench. Arguably, when Ms. Redford says, “if people don’t like it they challenge it”, she really means, go ahead challenge it, because our people will ensure you won’t succeed anyway. Judicial independence is a myth. Sadly, even if judges such as Mr. Gaschler Q.C. and others are not actually influenced by the incestuous politics underlying judicial appointments, the perception of political patronage nevertheless exists?

Who is George J. Gaschler, Q.C.? We really don’t know. Doubtless, however, we will soon find out.



[1] http://alberta.ca/home/NewsFrame.cfm?ReleaseID=/acn/200807/240947596F5B7-9F92-E368-2444C374CA7EF234.html
[2]http://content.calgary.ca/CCA/City+Hall/Business+Units/Law+Department/Legal+Staff+Profiles/Prosecutions+Research+and+Administration/George+Gaschler+QC.htm
[3] http://www.nationtalk.ca/modules/news/article.php?storyid=12035
[4] http://www.justice.gov.ab.ca/organization/default.aspx?id=896
[5] http://www.justsolgen.gov.ab.ca/organization/justice_system.aspx?id=3164
[6] http://calsun.canoe.ca/News/Columnists/Bell_Rick/2008/08/31/6621796-sun.php
[7] http://calsun.canoe.ca/News/Columnists/Bell_Rick/2008/08/31/6621796-sun.php
[8] Chomsky, Noam, Necessary Illusions – Though Control in Democratic Societies. Anansi Press Ltd, Concord, Ontario: pg. 10.
[9] http://www.assembly.ab.ca/net/index.aspx?p=mla_bio&rnumber=08


Submitted by:

David G. Chow
Fagan & Chow
Barrister